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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to two different plea agreements covering four different cases, 
Curtis Hartshorn pled guilty to one count each of: delivery of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), escape, issuing a check without sufficient funds, and grand theft. 
When all was said and done, Mr. Hartshorn was left with an aggregate prison sentence 
of at least four, but no more than twelve, years. After being sentenced, Mr. Hartshorn 
filed a motion for a sentence reduction, pursuant to Idaho criminal Rule 35 (hereinaffer 
Rule 35 motion), as to each of the four offenses, as well as a motion to withdraw his 
plea of guilty to the grand theft charge. Those motions were all denied. 
On appeal, Mr. Hartshorn contends that the district court denied him his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by holding a hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea where defense counsel was not present. He further contends that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motions. 
In response, the State claims that Mr. Hartshorn did not have a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel in pursuing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because such 
proceedings constitute a "collateral attack" on his conviction, not a "critical stage" of his 
criminal case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-13.) The State further argues that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Hartshorn's Rule 35 motions. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.14-20.) 
The present Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the State's first argument-its 
claim that withdrawal of plea proceedings do not constitute a "critical stage" of the 
defendant's case. Because the State's second argument is unremarkable, no response 
is necessary. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedincis 
Although the factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set 
forth in Mr. Hartshorn's opening brief (see Appellant's Brief, pp.1-10) and, therefore, 
need not be repeated herein, one factual clarification is necessary in light of a claim 
made in the State's Respondent's Brief. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hartshorn discussed the fact that he was 
unrepresented at the February 12, 2008 hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea 
even though his appointed counsel, the Bonneville County Public Defender's Office, 
had, a year earlier, been ordered by the district court to continue to represent 
Mr. Hartshorn "for all purposes other than appeal." (Appellant's Brief, p.13, n.13.) 
Mr. Hartshorn also noted that the Record on Appeal was silent as to why 
Mr. Hartshorn's attorneys were absent from the February 12, 2008 hearing. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 13, n. 14.) 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State speculates, based on a one-line entry in the 
district court's Register of Actions, that Mr. Hartshorn's counsel failed to appear at the 
February 12, 2008 hearing because counsel had previously withdrawn. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.13, n.4.) In support of this guess, the State points out that the Register of 
Actions contains and entry, dated April 6, 2007, stating "Notice of Withdrawal." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.13, n.4.) 
It is important to point out that the State's speculation is, at this point, just that- 
rank speculation. Since the State has not augmented the record with a copy of the 
"Notice of Withdrawal," one can only guess that that filing was an attempt on the part of 
counsel to withdraw. 
More importantly though, it should be noted that mere "notice" was likely 
inadequate to effectuate the withdrawal of counsel. See I.C.R. 44.1. This would seem 
to be especially true where, as here, the district court had already ordered counsel to 
continue representing the defendant. (Grand Theft Case R., p.61.) 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court deny Mr. Hartshorn his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by 
holding a hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea where defense 
counsel was not present? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Hartshorn's Rule 35 
motion? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Denied Mr. Hartshorn His Sixth Amendment Riaht To Counsel By 
Holdincl A Hearina On The Motion To Withdraw His Guiltv Plea Where Defense Counsel 
Was Not Present 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hartshorn argued that the district court denied him his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by holding a hearing on the motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea where defense counsel was not present. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.) In 
support of that argument, he identified a host of federal and state cases holding that 
proceedings on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea constitute a "critical stage" of the 
criminal case; he observed that there is a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at any such 
critical stage; and he argued that, since neither his appointed counsel, nor any other 
attorney, was present during the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the 
district court was precluded from proceeding with that hearing. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.12-14.) In terms of the relief requested, Mr. Hartshorn asked that the district court 
order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea be vacated, and that his case be 
remanded for a new hearing on that motion. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) 
In response, the State claims that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a 
collateral attack on the defendant's conviction, not a critical stage of the case where the 
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-13.) 
Critical to this argument is a temporal distinction between pre-sentencing and post- 
sentencing motions to withdraw guilty pleas. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7, 8-9, 9-10, 
I 1 .  Specifically, the State argues that the cases cited in Mr. Hartshorn's opening brief 
(for the proposition that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage of a criminal 
case) are distinguishable from this case on the basis that some of those cases dealt 
with pre-sentencing attempts by defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas, whereas 
Mr. Hartshorn's motion to withdraw his piea was filed post-sentencing. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.6-11.) However, for the reasons set forth below, the State's arguments are 
without merit. 
Notably, it appears that the temporal distinction between pre-sentencing and 
post-sentencing motions to withdraw guilty pleas, which the State now urges this Court 
to view as dispositive,' has only been found to have been significant in one case- 
State v. Winston, 19 P.3d 495 (Wash. Ct. App., Div. 1 2001). That case, however, was 
very poorly reasoned. In Winsfon, the Washington Court of Appeals relied on 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), for the proposition that "[ilt is well- 
established that there is no constitutional right to counsel in post conviction 
proceedings, other than the first direct appeal of right," Winston, 19 P.3d at 497, and, 
Elsewhere in its brief, the State suggests that ldaho law has already embraced a 
substantive distinction between pre-sentencing and post-sentencing motions, holding 
that the former are non-critical stages of the defendant's criminal case. (See 
Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.) Specifically, the State contends that because, under 
State v. Wade, 125 ldaho, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1994), appointment of counsel for a 
defendant filing a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to I.C.R. 35 is governed by 
an ldaho statute (I.C. § 19-852), not the Sixth Amendment, the same must hold true for 
appointment of counsel for a defendant filing a post-sentencing motion to withdraw his 
plea. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.) There are a number of flaws in the State's 
argument though. First, a motion to withdraw a piea is a fundamentally different motion 
than a motion for a sentence reduction. Second, in the Wade Opinion, there is no 
indication that a Sixth Amendment argument was ever presented to the Court of 
Appeals. See Wade, 125 ldaho at 523-24, 873 P.2d at 168-69; cf. State v. Wegner, 
2009 WL 32484, *3 (Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2009) (not yet final) (holding that an ldaho statute 
governs the question of whether counsel should be appointed for a motion to withdraw a 
plea, but containing no indication that a Sixth Amendment argument was ever 
presented by the defendant). Third, even though section 19-852 was applied in Wade, 
the Court of Appeals did note in that case that "[a] criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 
motion." Wade, 125 ldaho at 523, 873 P.2d at 168. 
based on this language in Finley, it held that because Mr. Winston's motion to withdraw 
his plea was filed after his conviction was entered ("post conviction") Finley mandated 
that Mr. Winston had no right to counsel. Winston, 19 P.3d at 499. While such a bright- 
line rule is certainly easy to apply, it represents an overly broad reading of Finley. 
In fact, in Finley, when the Supreme Court spoke of "postconviction review," it 
was speaking of a true collateral attack on the defendant's conviction-a civil 
proceeding, separate and apart from the defendant's underlying criminal case. Finley, 
481 U.S. at 553, 556-57. Thus, in Finley, the Court was not considering application of a 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at all; rather, it was concerned with the question of 
whether a petitioner has a Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in his collateral 
attack on his conviction. Id. at 555-59. 
Moreover, as the State candidly acknowledges, other courts, i.e, the Florida 
courts, have explicitly rejected the idea that a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a plea 
is not a critical stage simply because of its timing. (See Respondent's Brief, p.10.) For 
example, in Padgeff v. Stafe, 743 So.2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), the Florida Court 
of Appeals noted the Finley Court's use of the term "postconviction" and recognized that 
"[iln the literal sense," a motion to withdraw a plea filed after sentencing "is 
postconviction since it comes only after an adjudication of guilt," but it rejected the 
notion that the term "postconviction" has ever "been given this limited meaning," and it 
pointed out that "[tlhe term postconviction is generally equated with the concept of 
collateral relief, i.e., an attack on the conviction and sentence outside of trial and appeal 
process." Id. at 72. Indeed, the Court of Appeals noted that if the Finley Court's use of 
the term "postconviction" were to be taken literally, even a sentencing hearing would be 
considered a post conviction proceeding wherein the defendant would have no right to 
counsel. Id. Thus, the Court in that case held that where the defendant, pursuant to 
court rule, brings a timely motion in his criminal case to withdraw his plea, a hearing on 
that motion is a critical stage of the criminal case and, therefore, the defendant has a 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at that hearing. Id. at 73. 
Consistent with the Padgetf Court's Opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court, in 
Fortson V. State, 532 S.E.2d 102 (Ga. 2000), another case cited by State (Respondent's 
Brief, p.10), also held that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, filed in the defendant's 
criminal case, was a critical stage of the proceeding even though the motion was filed 
after sentencing. Id. at 103-05. In that case, the Georgia Supreme Court explicitly 
rejected the government's contention that a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is akin to a true collateral attack on a conviction (which would be a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus under Georgia law): 
A habeas corpus proceeding is a collateral, civil action which may be 
brought after the right to direct appeal is exhausted and the underlying 
criminal action, including the critical stage of prosecution, has ended. On 
the other hand, a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea involves 
intricacies of the law and advocacy by the State against the defendant. 
Because these elements differentiate the guilty plea withdrawal 
proceeding from the habeas corpus proceeding, we accordingly reject the 
State's argument that a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 
analogous to a habeas corpus proceeding such that appointment of 
counsel would not be necessary. 
Id. at 104-05. 
Turning to Idaho law, it ought to be apparent that Mr. Hartshorn's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, filed in his criminal case and pursuant to a rule of criminal 
procedure (I.C.R. 33(c)), was not a "collateral atiack on his conviction because it was 
not a "postconviction" claim within the meaning of Finley. Obviously, Mr. Hartshorn 
could have raised a collateral attack to his conviction by filing a petition for post- 
conviction relief under Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), 
I.C. 33 19-4901 et seq., and the claim presented in such a petition would have certainly 
been similar to the motion that was filed in this case, see, e.g., State v. Jakoski, 2002 
WL 31855374, *5 (Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2002) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a 
defendant may challenge an allegedly invalid plea under I.C.R. 33(c) or the UPCPA, 
and noting that after the time lapses for filing Rule 33 motions and direct appeals, the 
UPCPA supplies the exclusive mechanism by which a defendant can challenge his 
plea"); however, that is clearly not the approach that Mr. Hartshorn took in this case. 
More importantly though, in trying to draw an arbitrary distinction between 
pre-sentencing and post-sentencing motions to withdraw pleas, the State has lost sight 
of the applicable standard for determining whether a particular proceeding constitutes a 
critical stage of the defendant's case: whether the "substantial rights of a criminal 
accused may be affected" at that stage.' Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). 
Applying this standard to the case at hand, it is clear that any hearing on 
Mr. Hartshorn's motion is a critical stage of his criminal case because, regardless of its 
timing, such a hearing has a monumental impact on his rights. "It cannot be gainsaid 
Insofar as the State implies that if a motion filed pursuant to I.C.R. 33(c) is deemed to 
be a critical stage of the defendant's criminal case, he will have a perpetual right to 
appointed counsel (see Respondent's brief, pp.10-11 (discussing the fact that both 
Florida and Georgia have put time limits on the filing of motions to withdraw guilty 
pleas)), such concerns are not part of the applicable analysis. Moreover, such concerns 
are unfounded because, although I.C.R. 33 does not contain any explicit time limits, it is 
exceptionally clear under ldaho law that a district court's jurisdiction to entertain a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea generally expires at the conclusion of the defendant's 
direct appeal or, if no direct appeal has been taken, 42 days after entry of the judgment 
of conviction. State v. Jakoski, 139 ldaho 352, 354-55, 79 P.3d 71 1, 713-14 (2003). 
that a defendant's guilty plea is the most critical stage of the proceeding as it forecloses 
his very right to a trial. Consequently, in the face of an allegedly involuntary plea, a plea 
withdrawal hearing is vital to ensuring the integrity of the process by which guilt may 
ultimately be determined." United States v. Davis, 239 F.3d 283, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2001). 
Given The New Information Provided To The District Court In Coniunction With 
Mr. Hartshorn's Rule 35 Motion. As Well As That Which Had Already Been Presented 
To The District Court At The Time Of His Sentencinq Hearinas, It Was An Abuse Of 
Discretion Not To Reduce Mr. Hartshorn's Sentences 
Because the State's arguments concerning Mr. Hartshorn's claim that the district 
court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motions are unremarkable, no 
response is necessary herein. Rather, Mr. Hartshorn refers this Court back to the 
arguments made at pages 14-16 of his Appellant's Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, as well as those that were articulate in his 
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hartshorn respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district 
court's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the grand theft charge, 
and that it remand his case for a new hearing on that motion. He also requests that this 
Court reduce his sentences. 
DATED this 21'' day of October, 2009. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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